Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal, we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness on market access due to product specific rules of origin (PSRO) that apply at the tariff-line level. The R-index is constructed for rules of origins under NAFTA and under the single list applying to PANEURO, the new regime applying to all EU preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how identical PSRO have different impacts across countries, and how the complexity of PSRO varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to account for differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. The index is then used to assess composition effects across countries subjected to some set of PSRO and to compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under both regimes.
Reciprocity (as in the FTAs) or not (as in the GSP and other initiatives), these PTAs being less than a Customs Union, establishing origin is key to the implementation of the agreement, since it is how imports are prevented from entering the preferential area through the low-tariff partner, a situation that might be highly liberalizing in the absence of Rules of Origin (RoO) if partners were to compete for tariff revenue (see Richardson, 1995) . Neglected until recently, RoO are attracting increasing attention, both theoretically and empirically.
1 The theoretical literature is slowly leading to a consensus on the effects of RoO, several of these going beyond the avowed intent of conferring origin. 2 The empirical literature is more scattered, partly because the necessary data on utilization rates of origin are only starting to become available, and are also difficult to interpret (see below). Because of the complexity of the RoO (both regime-wide and product-specific RoO (PSRO) but mostly because of the latter), after controlling for the extent of preferential access, patterns of utilization rates show a great disparity across activities, partners, and PTAs.
This complexity in the patterns of uptake of preferences makes it extremely difficult to assess how much market access Southern partners are getting from these PTAs. At the same time, knowing more about the extent of effective market access is of significance for the evolving multilateral trade negotiations, since one of the objectives of the Doha Round is to provide increased market access for developing countries, and LDCs in particular.
3
This paper describes and evaluates the PSRO governing the PTAs entered by the two leading Northern partners, the EU and the US. It draws on utilization rate data on Mexican exports to the US in 2001 and similar data for ACP exports to the EU in 1 Early theoretical contributions include Krueger (1995) , Krishna and Krueger (1995) , and previous efforts at quantification include Herin (1986) and Koskinen (1983) for EFTA, Estevadeordal (2000), Carrère and de Melo (forthcoming), and Anson et al (forthcoming) for NAFTA. Brenton and Imawaga (2004) survey the debate and policy implications of RoO, and Cadot et al. eds. (forthcoming) assembles recent contributions. 2 The main effects are: (i) raising the costs of production; (ii) redirecting investment towards the partners to satisfy RoO; (iii) trade suppression (i.e. changing trade patterns within the zone to satisfy RoO) 3 In view of these objectives, it is worth recalling that it is at the insistence of industrialized countries that harmonization of RoO was not put on the agenda of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. For further discussion, see Brenton and Imagawa (2004) .
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. 4 More specifically, the paper makes two contributions.
First, we construct an R-index of restrictiveness of PSRO along the lines first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) in the case of NAFTA, modifying it and extending it for the EU single-list (SL) set in place under PANEURO. This synthetic Rindex is then used to compare PSRO under NAFTA and PANEURO.
To anticipate our main conclusions, first, we show in the case of the PANEURO that the R-index is useful to summarize how countries are differently affected by the same set of RoO because of their different export baskets to the EU. Second, we show that the R-index is a relatively reliable statistic in the sense that, subject to caveats, after controlling for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, it accounts for differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. Finally, together with utilization rates, the index can be used to estimate total compliance costs of PSRO.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contrasts PSRO under PANEURO and NAFTA and discusses the construction of a restrictiveness index (R-index) at the tariff line level. Section 3 then applies this index to describe and compare the two regimes for broad product categories. Having checked that the R-index is indeed correlated with utilization rates after having controlled for preference rates, Section 4 uses the distribution of R-index values to non-parametric estimates of upper and lower bounds 4 The implicit assumption here is that the PANEURO and NAFTA regimes will survive pretty much unaltered in the negotiations underway for an FTAA and for the EPAs. Estevadeordal and Suominen (forthcoming) describe in great detail the complexities of RoO across PTAs. Cadot, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2005) use the approach in this paper to compare AGOA and EBA ROO for those ESA countries. Compared with EBA, AGOA has less product coverage, but simpler ROO, since a single criterion of 35% regional value content is used to confer origin outside of textiles, while for textiles and apparel (T&A) a yarn forward rule which would be the strictest criterion under the observation rule adopted in this paper. They conclude that EBA and AGOA give similar treatment, except for T&A for non-LDCs where AGOA PSRO are stricter.
of total compliance costs associated with rules of origin.
Section 5 concludes. An appendix describes in detail the observation rule used to construct the R-index.
The NAFTA and PANEURO regimes
Virtually all PTAs have regime-wide Roo and PSRO. We describe briefly those rules in the case of NAFTA and PANEURO, starting with regime-wide rules.
Regime-wide rules. These usually include: (i) a de minimis (or tolerance) criterion which stipulates a maximum percentage of non-originating materials that can be used without affecting the origin of the final product; (ii) cumulation 5 ; (iii) rollup 6 ; (iv) duty-drawback 7 ;(v) certification method. How these 5 Cumulation allows PTA producers to import non-originating materials from other PTA member countries without affecting the final product's originating status. Three types of cumulation rules are distinguished: bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation. Bilateral cumulation is most common and applies to trade between two partners in a PTA. It stipulates that producers in country A can use inputs from country B without affecting the final good's originating status provided that the inputs are themselves originating (i.e. provided that they themselves satisfy the area's ROOs). Under diagonal cumulation (the basic principle of the EU's PANEURO system), countries tied by the same PTA can use materials that originate in any member country as if the materials were originating in the country where the processing is undertaken. Finally, under full cumulation, all stages of processing or transformation of a product within the PTA can be counted as qualifying content regardless of whether the processing is sufficient to confer originating status to the materials themselves. It is easy to show that full cumulation allows for greater fragmentation of the production process than the more commonly used bilateral and diagonal cumulation, and hence is less restrictive. 6 The absorption or roll-up principle allows non-originating materials which have acquired origin by meeting specific processing requirements to maintain this origin when used as input in a subsequent transformation. In other words, the non-originating materials are no longer taken into account in calculating value added. The roll-up or absorption principle is used in most PTAs (in particular the EU's GSP and Cotonou), although a few have exceptions for the automotive sector.
7 Duty drawbacks are refunds to exporters of tariffs paid on imported intermediate inputs. Many PTAs, especially in the Americas, mandate the elimination of duty-drawback schemes for exports to partner countries, on the ground that a duty drawback claimed by a producer in A to export to B would put that producer at a competitive advantage compared to domestic producers in B given that the A-producer already benefits from the elimination of intra-bloc tariffs. The elimination of duty drawbacks as regime-wide rules differ between NAFTA and PANEURO is described in table 1. can be ranked in terms of its restrictiveness on the basis of the following observation: A change of classification at the chapter level (CC) has to be more difficult to satisfy than a change at the Heading (CH) level; likewise, a change at the heading level has to be stricter than at the subheading (CS) level, and a change at the subheading level more stringent than at the tariff line or item level (CI). This implies that part of a PTA's formation can imply a cut in the profitability of finalgood assembly for export to partner countries in the area, although tariff escalation, when present, already provides some protection for finalassembly operations (as it implies lower tariffs on intermediate goods than on final ones).
the following observation rule (larger values corresponding to more restrictiveness): exceptions (EXC); (iii) allowances (ALLOW) that relax the restrictiveness of obtaining origin, allowances being used only for PANEURO. All but allowances make it more difficult to satisfy origin, so the observation rule assigns higher values to the index resulting from the CTC when these other requirements are added on (and a lower value when there is an allowance). Table 2 10 In all the computations that follow we restrict our analysis to request for ACP treatment from ACP countries. We do this simply because this is the tariff regime requested in the majority number of cases, even though tariff-free under GSP (EBA) preferences would have given equal or greater market access. This request for sometimes less favorable preferences could index value for the LDC (40 countries) and non-LDC (37 countries) group of ACP countries. Since, roughly speaking, increasing numbers in that classification correspond to more round-about techniques of production (lower sectoral value-added ratios), it appears that PSRO rules become generally more restrictive for sectors requiring more processing. In a world of increasing verticalization of trade, and in which tariff escalation implies that protection (and hence tariff preferences)
increase with the degree of processing, this pattern suggests that final goods producers in Northern countries lobby successfully to obtain restrictive PSRO for final goods (while at the same time using VC restrictions to prevent Southern producers from purchasing intermediates outside the zone). LDC and non-LDC interests appear to be equally affected by PSRO, at least at this level of aggregation.
The picture changes dramatically when one moves from the product composition to differences in the volume of exports within these sector categories. Table 2 
. Applying this reasoning, we obtain the estimates in rows 1-3 in table 6
(unweighted estimates in parenthesis). The rather large differences between the PANEURO and NAFTA estimates, especially when using unweighted data, suggest caution in interpreting these estimates since too much weight is probably given to outlier observations with small trade volumes.
Nonetheless, the higher estimates for the EU are coherent with likely higher administrative costs associated with certification. PANEURO relies on a two-step private and public certification method which is stricter that certification under NAFTA where it is single-step private certification that need not be carried out each time (see Estevadeordal and Suominen (forthcoming, tables 5 and 6). . 16 Yet, according to the bottom row of table 6, there were 10% of tariff lines. At best, the data are only broadly consistent with the estimated values reported here.
Conclusions
This paper has compared the product-specific rules of origin (PSRO) that are used in the two best-known North-South FTAs: at the HS-4 digit, however the fact that EU ROO were given at the more detailed HS 6 digit level, we have constructed our index at the HS 6 digit level that corresponds to the 5595 tariff lines (see table A1 ). This also facilitates comparisons with NAFTA's ROOs which are defined at the HS-6 level.
Let ∆CC stand for a change of chapter, ∆CH for a change of heading, ∆CS for a change of subheading, and ∆CI for a change of item. Like Estevadeordal's index, our index is based on the following classification convention for Change of Tariff Classification (CTC) criteria:
Therefore, as far as the CTC is concerned, we follow the above ES's assumptions in the construction of our observation rule (see details in table A1).
In both EU SL and NAFTA, in most cases, a CTC criteria is always accompanied by one or two (in a few cases even 3) of the other requirements such as Value Content, Technical Requirement, Exception, Wholly obtained, Allowance and NONOR.
According to ES's assumptions a value of 2 is assigned to a Change of Subheading, 4 to a Change of Heading and 6 to a 31 Change of Chapter. Therefore the observation rule assigns higher values to the index resulting from the CTC when these other requirements are added (and assigns a lower value in the case of allowance being followed after the CTC criteria).
For instance, from table A1, a change of Heading -∆CH takes a value of 4, but the value increases to a 5 when ∆CH is accompanied by R1(Wholly obtained criteria) or R2(either one of ∆CS, Technical Requirement and Exception). Conversely, it takes a lower value of 3 when it is accompanied by an Allowance Requirement.
In the case of a Value Content requirement we have taken a different approach from ES since in our case the requirement varies between 50% and 85%. Thus we use a cut-off point of 60% originating, and we assign a value of 4 to a VC strictly smaller than 60% (VC1), and of 5 to a VC higher than or equal to 60% (VC2).
Therefore whenever a VC is combined with other requirements (including a CTC) the assigned value will depend on whether the percentage of VC is higher or lower compared to the cut- In a few instances (8.8% of tariff lines), EU PSRO allow for a choice between alternative composite rules to determine a product's origin. For each alternative, we computed a value for the R-index and we assigned the lowest index value for that line, since in principle the exporter, not customs, chooses which rule applies. We therefore assign the index value of the least stringent of the two rules.
Another alternative for exporters is between a VC rule and a composite alternative. This option was available for 29.4%
of the tariff lines. Again, we assigned the lowest index value to the corresponding tariff lines.
The largest differences between our index and ES's index come from the different approaches to the "wholly produced"
(WH). Index values are different mostly for two reasons.
First, because of the importance of agricultural goods in ESA exports, the overall value for our index is lower than ES's. Second, we have tried to take into account the choices facing exporters, and have consequently assigned the lowest possible value for the index when several options were available. Table A1 The Observation Rule to construct the R index
